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BOOK REVIEW
READING ELDEN’S MAPPING THE PRESENT
Ali Muhammad Rizvi1
Elden, Stuart, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of
a Spatial History, London, Continuum, 2002. ISBN: 0826458475
It  is  true that  the issue  of  ‘affinities’  between Heidegger and Foucault  remains
‘relatively  unexplored’.  It  is  not  the  case however that the  existence  of  a  relation
between the two thinkers has gone unnoticed in the literature. What has been missing is
the analysis of how the work of the two thinkers might have been related. Thus the
question is not to point out the existence of a relation but to specify the ‘mode’ of
relation. This is exactly what Stuart Elden has attempted to do in his excellent study.
There are several key concepts that might constitute the focal point in arriving at
an understanding of any affinities between the two thinkers, such as the concept of
freedom, truth, subject, space and time etc. However, Stuart Elden has explored the
relationship between  (perhaps) the two greatest figures of twentieth century Western
thought through the relatively neglected concepts of time and space. 
According  to  Elden’s  narrative  Heidegger,  and  Foucault  following  him,
reconceptualise  space  and  time  in  wholly  non-Cartesian  terms.  The  Cartesian
conceptualisation of space and time in narrow mathematical terms, as aggregates of
points  and  instants  respectively  is  replaced by  a  non-mathematical,  more  prosaic
(primordial?) and experiential understanding of space and time. Space and time are
now conceived experientially and poetically rather than in mathematical terms. The
notion of experience (and Elden does not make that notion sufficiently clear)2 is not to
1 I would like to thank Stuart Elden for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of this review.
Thanks are also due to Robert Young for his help with the final draft.
2 This may not be simply a ‘fault’ of interpretation but also the ‘evidence’ of how and to what  extent
Phenomenology  still  haunts  the  thought  of  both  Heidegger  and  Foucault  [especially  in  Foucault’s
introduction to Binswanger’s  Dream and Existence where he uses such terms as lived experience and lived
space etc. quite frequently, cf. Stuart Elden,  Mapping the Present: Heidegger Foucault and the Project of A Spatial
History,  (London:  Continuum Press,  2001)  117.].  The dual  meaning  inherent in  the  term ‘originary
experience’ widely used by Heidegger and to a lesser extent by Foucault might relate to this and have
aggravated the complexity of the problem.
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be thought of here in (solely) existential terms, but should be understood ontologically.3 
Heidegger  and Foucault not  only reconceptualise space and time but they also
point towards a new way of relating space and time. Space and time are no longer seen
in exclusive terms. Space and time are now seen as two related poles of being, the oft-
mentioned space-time. According to Elden, Heidegger develops a new conception of
space and time that goes beyond the traditional dichotomy of space and time towards a
notion of ‘spatial’ time and ‘temporal’  space. In Elden’s words,  “Place is  historical:
history  is  platial”.4 It  has  been  argued  since  the  eruption  of  the  so  called
modernity/postmodernity debate that while modernity consisted in giving priority to
time over space, postmodernism reverses this by giving priority to space over time.5
Elden  convincingly  dismisses  such  naive  binary  oppositions.  It  is  not  simply  the
question of giving priority to space over time. What defines the new way of thinking
inaugurated by Heidegger, and carried to new peaks by Foucault, is the question of
conceptualising space  and time anew and to think of  them not  exclusively  but  in
relational  terms.  The new way of  thinking inaugurated  by  Heidegger  is  relational
through and through. As  Heidegger  writes:  “  .  .  .  time and space  are  .  .  .  more
originary; and ultimately, they are time-space, which is not a coupling of time and
space but what is more originary in their belonging together”6.
This leads us, according to Elden, to a new conception of history, which is no
longer  to  be seen as an assemblage of  events  in linear sequence but  as  spatialised
history, a history which uses space not merely as an object of analysis but rather as a
tool of historical analysis. While Heidegger confined himself to the reconceptualisation
of space and time and their new relation through engaging with thinkers from past and
present, Foucault actually wrote spatial histories. Elden undertakes a sustained and, at
points, original analysis of Foucault’s three key works (Histoire de la folie7, The Birth of the
Clinic, and Discipline and Punish)8 to demonstrate this. His analysis of Discipline and Punish
especially is noteworthy as it reads the book not in terms of a history of the prison, but
3 It is indeed very difficult to keep track of this subtle and very important difference in Heidegger and
Foucault.  One  possible  way  to  distinguish  between  the  ‘existential’  and  ‘ontological’  conceptions  of
experience is to conceive the former as ‘subjective’ experience, while the latter as experience ‘of’  ‘subject’
[or more precisely the experience that a subject go through]. Although this distinction readily presents its
own difficulties it does go some way to ‘convey’ the meaning of this difference. Still another way to further
clarify the difference might be to conceive ‘existential’ sense of experience as pertaining to the level of
connaissance while the ontological sense of experience as falling within the field of savoir. While on the level of
‘subjective’ and hence existential experience, the subject remains the same; on the level of the experience
‘of’ subject that is on the ontological level ‘subject’ itself undergoes a fundamental transformation.
4 Elden, Mapping the Present 91.
5 See for example David Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
6 Quoted in Elden, Mapping the Present 56.
7 Elden bases his analysis on the unabridged French original as against the abridged edition (Madness and
Civilisation) available to English readers.
8 Cf. Elden, Mapping the Present 120-150. This is apart from his introductory chapter on Foucault (93-119),
which defines key Foucauldian concepts such as archaeology, genealogy, limit experience, episteme, techne,
dispositif, historical ontology, and defines the Foucauldian project of  Mapping the Present in terms of these
concepts.
COSMOS AND HISTORY 179
as a history of the modern soul.
How far has Elden been successful in relating the two thinkers or showing crucial
affinities between them? As far as showing parallels in interests and structural affinities
are concerned, I think he has shown quite amply and successfully that these exist. He
seems to me also to be right in selecting space and time as crucial terms to explore the
relation between the two thinkers. However, when it comes to specifying the ‘howness’
of  the relation and pinpointing the ‘causal’  links, he has not  been very successful,
although he leaves ample material for anyone willing to explore the issue further. I will
confine myself to pointing towards a few key points, which I believe need to be thought
anew. 
The notion of  Augenblick (and the related Einblick) is important for Elden’s strategy
for  finding  a  fundamental  (primordial?)  link  that  relates  Heidegger  to  Foucault.
Through this crucial Heideggerian notion Elden points towards the notion of time as
the moment “where future and past collide in the present, as the temporality of the
moment”.9. According to Elden the Heideggerian notion of time as  Augenblick can be
linked to Foucault’s history of the present. In two ways at least. The notion of Augenblick
portrays time in terms of the moment, now and here (the present) and not in terms of
past or future. Of course the ‘now’ here is a richer ‘now’ than the ordinary ‘now’ in the
sense that it ‘contains’ in it both the past and the future in the same fashion in which
the notion of ‘present’  is  now reconceptualised to incorporate both past and future
(Elden quotes Heidegger as saying that  “eternity  is in the moment”).10 The second
reason is that the notion of ‘moment’ also points towards the spatial side of the present,
what Elden calls “the double meaning of present, the temporal and spatial signifier”.11
Thus, according to Elden, because Heidegger reconceptualises the notion of time as
‘the moment’, i.e. as the present in both a temporal and spatial sense, he paves the way
for the Foucauldian notion of the history of the present as the history of the ‘now and
here’.
This reading makes sense to a certain extent.  However,  the analogy cannot be
stretched  too  far.  Foucault’s  history  of  the  present  certainly  partakes  in  the
Heideggerian notion of time as ‘the colliding moment of past and future’ in the sense
that he rejects romantic history (history based on past) and teleological history (futuristic
history)  and conceptualises the present in terms incorporating both past and future.
However, one should bear in mind that, for Foucault, there is no single unique present
as there is no single unique past or single unique future. Therefore, there are potentially
innumerable  histories  of  the present,  as there are  innumerable  (possible)  pasts and
futures. Foucault sees the present moment, the finitude that encircles us, as “not an
9 Elden, Mapping the Present 49.
10 Elden, Mapping the Present 45 Heidegger’s emphasis.
11 Elden,  Mapping the Present 46. I have left out in this summary Elden’s important claim that Heidegger
develops his notion of time as Augenblick  in the context of his reading of Nietzsche (see Elden,  Mapping the
Present 44-49). Overall in the book Elden’s claim is that Foucault’s Nietzsche is a Nietzsche mediated by the
Heideggerian reading. Important though they are I have not touched on these historical and biographical
issues in my review (cf. Elden, Mapping the Present 10-13, 49-62, 79-80, 102-103 and 111-112).
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end, but the curve and knot of time in which the end is beginning”.12. But there are as
many (possible)  ends as  there are  (possible)  beginnings.  Thus the question of  ‘our’
present  arises  here.  Which  present  out  of  the  innumerable  (potential  and  actual)
presents is ‘our’ present? 
The above  question (or  rather  questioning)  brings  us to  the  strategic intent  of
Foucault’s work. Foucault’s history of the present is a history of thought. As Deleuze
puts it so beautifully “Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself
from what it thinks (the present), and be able finally to ‘think differently’ (the future)”.13
This is Foucault’s historical ontology of difference. It is ontology and not epistemology
(in the Kantian sense) because Foucault refuses to separate the question of thought from
the question of  being.14 It is history because thought has history; thought has past,
present and future. It is history of difference because thought thinks through thinking
differently; difference is the very being of thought and very being of being as well! [In
Hegelian terms ‘the being of being’ is nothingness, the nothingness which is the very
basis of thought15). It is also a history of difference because freedom is seen as realised in
the possibility of  difference, in the possibility of  thinking, acting, seeing,  and hence
being different. Thus, history of the present is a history of thought. But this history of
thought is strategically situated in the context of its ‘own history’, its ‘own present’ that
is the history which it owns and to which it belongs. Thus in strategic terms Foucault’s
history of thought situates itself in the context of the history of Western thought (Elden
quotes  Foucault  as  considering  Enlightenment  as  “our  most  “present  past”  [actuel
passé]”16 and Paul Veyne describes this in the following terms: “The future will eradicate
our  values;  the  past  of  their  dynastyless  genealogy  has  already  shown  them  into
question, but no matter: they are our flesh and blood, as long as they are our own
present”.17 This is how Foucault delimits his pursuits by situating himself in the context
of a particular and specific past, present and (particular possible) future(s).18 Through
this situation this history can only be dubbed as the mapping of the present, as Elden rightly
points out. But the history of the present is mapping of the present not only because it is a
situated history, it is mapping of the present basically and primarily because it is a strategic
history, a history aiming at and situated in the context of the modern and Postmodern
projects of freedom, what Foucault terms as “seeking to give a new impetus, as far and
wide as possible to the undefined work of freedom”.19 Thus the project of mapping of the
12 David Macey The Lives of Michel Foucault (London: Vintage, 1994) 89.
13 Gilles Deleuze Foucault trans. Dean Hard  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 119.
14 And in this sense Foucault is certainly a Hegelian cf. only allusive but very interesting remarks in “The
Discourse on Language” in Michel Foucault  The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. Sheridan (New York:
Pantheon, 1972) 235.
15 cf. Hegel’s Phenomenology esp. Introduction.
16 Elden, Mapping the Present 185n.
17 Paul Veyne “The Final Foucault and His Ethics”, trans. Catherine Porter and Arnold A. Davidson in
Arnold A. Davidson ed. Foucault and his Interlocutors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 226.
18 Of course there can be more than one interpretation possible of this particular context but that is a
different matter.
19 Michel Foucault, Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) 46.
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present is a project aiming to assess the strategic20 possibilities inherent in the present.
Elden has missed out this strategic side of the Foucauldian project, in my opinion, or at
least it has not been sufficiently emphasised.21
More problematic moments in relating the notion of Augenblick to Foucault’s project
however are when Elden links present to Dasein and presence. It is  worth quoting
Elden in full here:
 .  .  .  the human in the point of this  collision  is its  collision, the point of  its
collision, as Da-sein,  being-that-there, being the moment, being as presence. The
human in,  as,  the point  of  collision  is  simultaneously  future  and  past  in  the
present . . . Likewise, history too must orient toward the future with reference to
the past, by becoming, just as the Augenblick is the authentic present, a history of the
present. This history, of the present as presence is also situated. This is what will
be meant by the mapping of the present.22
This is a rich and dense passage and there are several other similar passages throughout
the  book.  It  is  unfortunate  that  Elden  does  not  elaborate  them.  This  is  due  to
overemphasis  of  the  book on  interpretative  matters,  which  leaves  core conceptual
formulations rather underdeveloped. Passages like this show how Elden glosses over
certain crucial differences between Heidegger and Foucault in order to specify affinities
between the two thinkers. To think of Dasein as the site (moment) of present by equating
present with presence is, in my view, to misinterpret the Foucauldian enterprise. The
notion  of  being  as  presence  or  Dasein as  presence  seems  to  me  to  be  very  un-
Foucauldian. Such a reading of Foucault underestimates the extent to which Foucault’s
thought has been able to free itself from the shackles of phenomenology.23 The fact that
Foucault translated Dasein as presence obviously does not prove any thing. Also Elden’s
reference to Foucault’s introduction to Binswanger’s Dream and Existence in this context
seems to me problematic, as this is Foucault’s most phenomenological piece and not
just his most Heideggerian one.24 There is simply no ‘middle term’ available to link the
notion of present to presence in Foucault. Thus it is a mistake to see Foucault’s history
20 Strategic in Foucault is all  that is related to freedom. However, there are occasions (primarily in his
journalistic polemics) where Foucault uses strategic in the sense close to the Habermasian usage of the term
(see for example Michel Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever?” Le Monde May 11, (1979), reprinted in Michel
Foucault Dits et écrits, vols I-IV  (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) Vol. III: 790-794.
21 This is due to reasons, in my opinion, that pertain to crucial differences between Foucault and Heidegger,
the reasons I will be able only to touch upon briefly in the rest of the review.
22 Elden, Mapping the Present 49 emphasis in original.
23 Michel  Foucault,  Politics,  Philosophy,  Culture:  interviews  and  other  writings  1977-1984 ed.  Lawrence  D.
Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988) 22.
24 Cf. Elden, Mapping the Present 115-117. It is no surprise that Foucault’s retrospective comments on his
relation to this earlier introduction of  the Binswanger’s  work  occur with the specific  reference to  the
problematic conception of experience employed in that work: “To study form of experience in this way-in
their history-is an idea that originated with an earlier project, in which I made use of the methods of
existential analysis in the field of psychiatry and in the domain of “mental  illness”. For two reasons, not
unrelated to each other, this project left me unsatisfied: its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience,
and its ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice simultaneously ignored and took for granted” Foucault,
Foucault Reader 334, emphasis added.  
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of the present as a history of presence, or for that matter to read Heidegger’s history of
presence as history of the present in the Foucauldian sense. Dasein is not the site of truth
in Foucault's conception. Foucault’s history of present is not a history of presence, a
history of the manifestation of truth. Foucault did write histories of (the production of)
truth, but his history of present is not a history of the ‘flash of the truth’.25 According to
Foucault there is no ‘vision of truth’ available to us.26 Thus Foucault’s history of the
present is not primarily about truth, it is primarily about freedom27. And that is the
reason why the notion of authenticity is so alien to the Foucauldian enterprise. The
notion of ‘authentic present’ would have been anathema to Foucault.28 No present is
more authentic than the other, since no present involves presence. There is no certitude,
no truth underlying and securing any present. That’s why every present is dangerous,
and every history  of  the  present  as  a  history  of  thought  is  inherently  a  ‘perilous’
exercise.29  And  here  lies  the  crucial  distinction  between  the  Heideggerian  and
Foucauldian enterprises that Elden in my opinion has overlooked.30. As Veyne remarks:
“Foucault’s originality among the great thinkers of our century lay in his refusal  to
convert our finitude into the basis for new certainties”.31 The notions of authenticity
and present as presence are means to reintroduce such now ‘unwarranted’ certainties.
This ultimately boils down to two entirely different conceptions of time and ultimately
two different conceptions of being that are articulated by Foucault and Heidegger.
Commenting on Foucault’s  notion of man as historical  being, Agamben writes that
25 See Elden, Mapping the Present 75.
26 Foucault, Foucault Reader 54.
27 I do not want to underestimate the importance of truth in Foucault however. What I want to emphasise
by the above formulations is the fact that Foucault takes the problematic of truth in the context of freedom
and not vice versa. Or to put it differently the truth and related will to knowledge become problematic for
Foucault only in the context of freedom. This is manifested in two different ways Foucault problematises
the notion of truth. On the one hand,  Foucault tries to limit the concept of truth from within. Veyne
reports him as saying that “ the great question according to Heidegger, was to know what was the ground
of truth; according to Wittgenstein, it was to know what one was saying when one spoke the truth; “but in
my opinion” he added-and I am quoting his exact words, for I jotted them down-“the question is: how is it
that there is so little truth in truth?” [“d’où vient que la vèritè soit si peu varaie?”] Veyne “The Final Foucault and
His Ethics” 231, emphasis in the original. What Foucault was telling Veyne was something he had iterated
several times before. Hence in an earlier interview contrasting his own view to that of sceptics he said, “ . . .
it seems to me that for the sceptics, the ideal was to be optimists knowing relatively little about things, but
knowing what they knew in a very secure and unimpeachable way. Instead, what I am aiming for is a use
of philosophy which may enable us to limit the areas of knowledge” Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture 254.
This leads us to the second way in which Foucault tries to problematise the notion of truth. Foucault sees
the ‘will  to knowledge’ or ‘will  to truth’ as part  of the problem, the ways in which our ‘will  to truth’
produces the effects of power (which is the explicit theme of Foucault’s La Volontè de savoir). In later work he
speaks of delinking growth of capabilities from the effects of power they produce (see  Foucault,  Foucault
Reader 32-50).
28 Cf. Foucault, Foucault Reader 351.
29 Michel Foucault The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences   (New York: Random House, 1970)
328.
30 I do not say this in a critical manner because Elden’s concern is to look after affinities so he naturally
ignores and at times overlooks crucial distinctions.
31 Veyne “The Final Foucault and His Ethics” 5.
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“man is not a historical being because he falls into time, but precisely the opposite; it is
only because he is a historical being that he can fall into time, temporising himself.”32
Foucault’s conception of history of ontology can thus be differentiated clearly from the
Heideggerian project  of  historicizing ontology.33 According to Foucault  historicizing
ontology is no solution exactly as historicizing subject is no solution. What is required is
to account for the constitution of ‘different ontologies’ and ‘different subjects’ within the
historical field.  
The notion of  ‘authentic present’  amounts  to epistemologising the “ontology of
present”. An epistemological enterprise (in the Kantian sense) consists in separating the
contingency of being from the (presumed) certainty of thought and providing certitude
to our ‘contingent’ existence. Thus it purports to impart value to contingent existence
by  situating  it  in  the  context  of  the  universal,  the  unchangeable.  However, since
Nietzsche, the West knows that it has lost its claims to such an enterprise. Foucault
refuses to separate the questions of thought from the question of being. Foucault and
the tradition of historical epistemology to which he belongs, deny “that there is  an
irreducible  epistemological  divide  between  the  order  of  thought and  the  order  of
reality.”34 According to Foucault, thought is inherently uncertain and contingent and
hence the impossibility of the epistemological enterprise (in the Kantian sense) after this
realisation. Foucault does not try to reintroduce that lost certainty in the name of an
epistemology disguised as ontology. What Dreyfus and Rabinow have noted regarding
Kant in reference to Foucault also remains true regarding Elden’s Heidegger:
On Foucault’s reading Kant was modern but not mature. He heroically faced
the loss of human action in a metaphysical reality, but he sought to reground it
in epistemology . . . . Kant’s heroic break with the natural law and the cosmic
order, far from opening up the possibility for diversity, shifted the debate to the
search for the structure of human finitude which would provide universal norms
of human action.35 
Elden  in  my  opinion  overlooks  these  different  conceptions  of  ontology  and  their
corresponding relation  to  the  epistemological  enterprise  working  in  Foucault  and
Heidegger  respectively.  This  is  shown  by  his  attempt  to  find  parallels  in  the
Heideggerian distinction between  ontological  knowledge  and ontic  knowledge  with
Foucault's  notions  of  savoir and  connaissance  and claiming  that  the  former  is  about
ontological knowledge while the latter  corresponds to ontic  knowledge.  Elden links
‘ontological’ with being in general and ‘ontic’ with being in particular.36 This distinction
may  be  relevant  to  Heideggerian  concerns,  however  it  is  not  the  main  thrust  of
Foucault’s distinction between ontology and epistemology. Unlike Heidegger, who is
32 Giorgio Agamben Infancy and History tans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1993) 99.
33 Elden, Mapping the Present 99.
34 Nikolas Rose (1998) “Life, reason and history: reading Georges Canguilhem today” Economy and Society, 27
no. 2 & 3 (1998): 154-170, 163.
35 David C. Hoy ed., Foucault: A critical Reader Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 118.
36 Elden, Mapping the Present 22.
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concerned  with  the  distinction  between  ontology  and  ontic,  Foucault  is  mainly
concerned  with  the  difference  between  ontology  and  epistemology.   Thus  when
Foucault  uses  the  term  ‘ontology  of  present’  he  is  mainly  contrasting  it  to  an
epistemological  enterprise,  while  when  Heidegger  uses  the  term  ‘ontology’  he  is
concerned mainly with what he calls the question of being as such as opposed to this or
that being. The question of being as such does not concern Foucault in my opinion.
Thus to try to read Foucault through Heidegger on this point ignores this crucial issue.
The generality does not necessarily make an enterprise, ontology, as the mere fact that
one is  searching for the conditions  of  knowledge does  not  make it  (necessarily)  an
epistemology. Foucault’s point was that an enterprise aiming to arrive at the conditions
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge (savoir or  connaisance)  should not  be  separated  from
ontology, since one’s way(s) of knowing, thinking and acting are crucially and essentially
connected to and constitute, and are in turn constituted by, one’s way(s) of being. Thus
when we know, we simultaneously constitute and are constituted by what we know.
Any  enterprise  that  separates  the  search  for  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of
knowledge from the question of being (subject or object) is an epistemological enterprise
in the Kantian sense and is rejected by Foucault. Foucault’s work is an endeavour to
forge a  new relation between  ontology  and epistemology  by  pointing  towards the
primordial relation between thought and being. And this is the crucial link that joins
Foucault’s enterprise of archaeology and genealogy as a single whole, as two poles of
the same exercise.37, a point that Elden makes sufficiently clear.38 
Having noted a few critical points above, I must emphasise that Elden’s book is not
just about the issues broached here. It is a rich and complex book, which is at once an
interpretation  of  Heidegger  and  Foucault,  an  argument  for  the  importance  of
Heidegger for understanding Foucault and a forceful case for the claim that Foucault’s
Nietzsche  is  a  Nietzsche  mediated  by  Heidegger.  According  to  the  study  it  is
Heidegger’s Nietzsche who had a decisive impact on Foucault. It is also a study, which
stresses the importance of the “general question of the relationship between space and
history”.39 At the same time there is considerable material to be found on Nietzsche,
Kant and Holderlin among others. It is an amazing book in the sense that it can handle
such a variety of topics, and thinkers and issues and so many layers of argument in a
concise, readable and yet immaculate manner. Stuart Elden is a master of brevity. The
main body of the book is supplemented by nearly fifty pages of notes and an excellent
bibliography that will be of great help to those who want to pursue the issues of their
interest further, leaving the book accessible to the ‘general’ reader. The chapters on
Foucault and Heidegger can form excellent introductions to both thinkers in their own
right. 
Ali Muhammad Rizvi
La Trobe University, Australia
37 Foucault, Foucault Reader 46-50.
38 See Elden, Mapping the Present chapter 4.
39 Elden, Mapping the Present 2.
